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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
---oooOooo---
MAVIS WILLIAMS, 
-vs-
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
Case No. 15934 
FIRST COLONY LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
---oooOooo---
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
---oooOooo---
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant to 
recover Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) which represents 
the face amount of an insurance policy which plaintiff-
appellant alleges was issued or should have been issued by 
defendant-respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted defendant-respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the Summary 
Judgment entered by the Lower Court. 
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STATE!'lENT OF FACTS 
In stating the relevant facts, references to deposition 
transcripts will be made by stating the surname of the 
witness and the page number of the deposition transcript. 
References to exhibits will be made by stating the surname 
of the witness whose deposition contains the exhibit and 
the exhibit number. 
The principle figures in this action are plaintiff-
appellant, Mavis Williams and a former defendant in this 
action, Allen Meikle. 
Havis Williams is the widow of Dean Williams who 
died on April 19, 1976. Dean Williams is the individual 
who submitted an applicdtion for life insurance coverage to 
Allen Meikle on April 13, 1976. 
Allen Meikle is a part-time insurance salesman who was 
requested by !1avis Williams to seek life insurance coverage 
for Dean Williams. Allen l'leikle and Mrs. Williams were co-
employees at Hill Air Force Base and the two had been 
friends for approximately eight years before the transactions 
herein described took place (Williams, p. 6). Mr. Meikle is an 
agent for Occidental Life Insurance Company (Meikle, p. 6) and 
on occasion acts as a broker in locating coverage in other 
companies that he does not normally represent (Meikle p. 4). 
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Prior to the events described herein, Allen Meikle had 
never sold, or attempted to sell a policy for First Colony 
(Heikle, P· 50-51)· In fact, there had been no prior contract 
whatsoever between Meikle and First Colony (Meikle, p. 49-51). 
Other persons involved in the transactions herein 
described are Kenneth Bischoff and Lowell Smith. Messrs. 
Bischoff and Smith are partners engaged full time in the 
insurance business (Bischoff, pp. 6-7, 52). The partnership 
is the agent for Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company 
(Bischoff, p. 4). However, the partnership also acts as a 
broker in locating coverage for appl1cants in other companies 
that the partnership does not normally represent (Bischoff, 
p. 5). As in the case with Allen Meikle, neither Bischoff, 
Smith nor their agency had any association with First Colony 
prior to the incident described herein (Bischoff, p. 5). 
First Colony Life Insurance Company is a life under-
writer. It is represented in the State of Utah by its agent, 
United Underwriters Company. 
A. Circumstances Leading up to Application for Insurance. 
Mavis Williams and Allen Meikle were co-employees at 
Hill Air Force Base and had been acquainted for many years 
prior to the incidents and transactions described herein 
6) By reason of this association, Mrs. Williams (Williams, p. . 
was aware that Mr. Meikle was a part-time life insurance 
d l'nsurance broker (Williams, p. 13). salesman and also acte as an 
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In 1969, Navis Williams requested Allen Meikle to investi-
gate the possibility of procuring life insurance coverage for 
her husband, Dean Williams (Williams, pp. 13-14). Meikle 
responded that he would "check around" with several companies 
to find the coverage (Williams, p. 14). Mr. Meikle was 
successful in obtaining coverage with Occidental Life Insurance 
Company, the underwriter that he represented (Williams, p. 14). 
After the policy was issued, Mrs. Williams complained 
to ~tr. Meikle that the provisions of the Occidental policy were 
unsatisfactory and she asked if he would make some effort to 
locate other coverage (Williams, pp. 19-21). After some 
investigation, Mr. Meikle informed I1rs. Williams that he had 
located a more satisfactory policy and advised her to cancel 
the Occidental pol~cy (Williams, pp. 19-23). In mid-1974 
pursuant to Meikle's advice, Mrs. Williams cancelled the 
Occidental policy and gave Mr. Meikle a check for the first 
premium on the new policy (Williams, pp. 21, 24). After 
delivery of the premium check Mrs. Williams heard nothing for 
approximately one year (Williams, p. 23). After a one year 
period, Mr. Meikle returned Mrs. Williams' check and informed 
her that no policy had been obtained (Williams pp. 23-25). 
Mrs. Williams did not recall the name of the company involved 
(Williams p. 28). 
When Mr. Meikle returned the premium check and advised 
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Mrs. Williams that no insurance had been obtained, she 
requested that he continue to look for a t" f sa 1s actory policy 
(Williams, p. 28). 
Mr. Williams had a problem with high blood pressure 
a condition noted by the examining physician at the time of 
the application for the Occidental policy (Meikle, Ex. 1). 
By reason of this condition the prior Occidental policy had 
been subject to a rated premium (Meikle, p. 11). Thus, 
Meikle knew that finding coverage would be difficult (Meikle, 
p. 9-10). Therefore, Meikle sought the assistance of Kenneth 
Bischoff in locating a company willing to accept the risk 
(Meikle, p. 9). Meikle delivered to Bischoff the medical 
portion of the Occidental insurance application (attached as 
Ex. 1 to the Meikle deposition) which noted a history of high 
blood pressure (Meikle, pp. 16-17; Bischoff pp. 12, 18). 
Kenneth Bischoff contacted United Underwirters and 
requested its assistance in locating coverage (Bischoff p. 12). 
A short time thereafter, United Underwriters contacted Mr. 
Bischoff and informed him that the information had been for-
warded to First Colony Life Insurance Company (Bischoff, pp. 
12-13). Thereafter, First Colony responded by forwarding to 
Bischoff a letter dated February 18, 1976 (attached as Ex. 
1 to the Bischoff deposition) wherein the company offered to 
consider the risk upon specific conditions, i.e., that an 
application be prepared and submitted, that a medical examination 
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with three blood pressure readings, and that the company 
receive a urine specium and x-rays. Mr. Bischoff then held 
a meeting with Meikle to review the conditions of coverage 
(Bischoff pp. 16-17). 
Upon receipt of the letter dated February 18, 1976 and 
the blank application forms, Mr. Meikle visited the home of 
Dean and Mavis Williams on April 13, 1976. After some dis-
cussion they decided to reduce the amount of coverage from 
$25,000.00 to $15,000.00 (Williams pp. 36-37). The application 
was completed and signed by Dean and Mavis Williams (Bischoff, 
Ex. 3). 
The initial premium for the contemplated coverage was 
computed at $65.88. Mavis Williams drew a check for that 
amount and delivered the check to Mr. Meikle. In return, 
Mr. Meikle delivered to Mrs. Williams a "Conditional Receipt" 
for the money (copy of Conditional Receipt attached as Ex. 2 
to the Bischoff deposition). The Conditional Receipt clearly 
sets forth the conditions to coverage: 
"This receipt is to be issued only if 
payment is made at the time the application is 
signed; otherwise it must not be detached. 
Unless the condition specified in para-
graph "FIRST" are fulfilled exactly, no insurance 
will become effective prior to policy delivery. 
Neither the agent nor the medical examiner is 
authorized to alter or waive these conditions. 
Received from Mavis Williams this 13th 
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day of ~pril, 1976, the sum of $65.88 in 
~onnect~on Wlt~ this application for life 
lnsurance to Flrst Colony Life Insurance c 
h · h 1 · · ompany, w ~c app lcat~on bears the same date and 
number as this receipt. 
FIRST. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT UNDER WHICH INSURANCE 
MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO POLICY DELIVERY. 
If the following conditions shall have been ful-
filled exactly: 
(a) All m7dical exami~ations, tests, x-rays, 
and electrocard~ograms requ~red by published 
company rules must be completed; 
(c) On the date that the insurance becomes 
effective in accordance with the provisions of 
this Receipt, each ?erson to be covered must 
be insurable at the class of risk applied for 
under the company's rules for the plan and the 
amount of insurance applied for without modifi-
cation and at the rate of premium paid. 
then insurance as provided by the terrr,s and 
conditions of the policy applied for and for 
an amount not exceeding that specified in 
paragraph "SECOND" will become effective on 
the latest of the following dates: {a) 
the date of Part 1 of this application; 
(b) the date of Part 1 of the application 
for any companion policy, if applicable; 
(c) the date of completion of all medical 
examinations, tests, x-rays, and electrocardio-
grams required by publlshed company rules; 
and (d) the date of issue, if any, requested 
in the application ... (emphasis added.) 
Hrs. Williams acknowledged delivery of the "Conditional 
Receipt" (Williams, p. 50). Moreover, the "Applicant's 
Declaration" written immediately above the signature of Dean 
and Mavis Williams on the application specifically noted that 
the coverage would begin at the time designated in the 
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"Conditional Receipt." (Bischoff, Ex. 3). 
During the course of the meeting on April 13, 1976, 
Meikle informed Mr. and Mrs. Williams of the necessity of the 
physical examination (Williams, p. 43). Mrs. Williams under-
stood that the medical examination was a requirement of the 
policy (Williams, p. 43). 
Q. Okay. What was your understanding of the 
purpose of the check? 
A. That was the first premium. $65.88 was the 
amount of the check. 
Q. Okay. Is there anything else that you 
can remember that was talked about 
regarding the effectiveness of this 
policy or anything that you or your 
husband would be required to do regarding 
this policy, other than make your payments 
to keep it in effect as you understood? 
A. My husband to meet with the doctor for a 
physical, which we were assured was a 
routine matter. 
Q. A routine matter. Now what do you mean by 
that? 
A. Mr. Meikle said they had all his medical 
records so that this was just a routine 
process. 
Q. Mr. Meikle said it was routine. What is 
your understanding of that word 'routine' 
in this sense, that it was insignificant? 
A. No. It was just filling a requirement. 
(Emphasis added, Williams, pp. 42-43) 
On the following day, an appointment was made with 
Dr. Alvord to conduct the medical examination (Williams, 
pp. 43-44). The examination date was set for April 20, 1976. 
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Prior to leaving the l'lilliams home on April 13, 1976 
Hrs. Williams claims that Mr. !1eikle stated: "Well, Dean, 
you can live dangerously now because you are completely 
covered." (Williams' Affidavit, Paragraph 5; Williams, p. 40). 
It is important to note that at the time of this alleged 
statement on April 13, 1976, Allen Meikle had no authority 
whatsoever from First Colony Life Insurance Company (Meikle, 
p. 50). In fact, on that date, First Colony Life Insurance 
Company was totally unaware that Allen Meikle was in any manner 
involved in the transaction. The "Single Case Agreement" 
which defined the relationship between the selling agent 
and the issuing company had not even been signed on April 13, 
1976 (Meikle, Exhibit 3). When the "Single Case Agreement" 
was finally executed on April 22, 1976, Allen .t-1eikle was not 
a party to the agreement (Meikle, Exhibit 3). Said agree-
ment was between Lowell Smith and First Colony Life 
Insurance Company. 
The first notice to First Colony Life Insurance Company 
that Meikle was involved in the transaction was when the 
insurance application was received by the company sometime 
after April 13, 1976 (Bischoff, Ex. 3). Even then, the nature 
and extent of Meikle's involvement was not disclosed. The 
1 that Me ikle was to receive a share application noted on Y 
of the sales commission (Bischoff, Ex. 3). 
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Following the meeting on April 13, 1976, Meikle 
forwarded the completed application and premium check to 
Kenneth Bischoff who in turn forwarded the same to United 
Underwriters. The matter then awaited the outcome of the 
physical examination from Dr. Alvord. 
B. Facts Occurring Subsequent to Application. 
On the date prior to the scheduled medical examination, 
Dean Williams died of cardio-vascular ailment. Rather 
than notify First Colony of the death, it was decided to 
conceal the fact of Mr. Williams death from First Colony 
in the hope that a policy would be inadvertantly issued by the 
company (Meikle, pp. 39-40; Bischoff, p. 36}. Thus, the 
matter remained sta~~c inasmuch as First Colony was awaiting 
notice that the cond~t~ons to its offer had been fulfilled. 
No policy was ever issued by First Colony Life nor was there 
any communication from First Colony inconsistent with the 
conditions stated in the Receipt which was delivered to 
Mrs. Williams on April 13, 1976. 
When First Colony was finally informed of the death of 
Dean Williams, the company tendered its check for the amount 
of the initial premium by mailing the same to Mrs. Williams. 
Mrs. Williams refused tender of the premium. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM DID NOT CREATE COVERAGE 
The circumstances of life insurance applications create 
a dilemma for the applicant and the insurance company. The 
company has an interest in obtaining its premium in advance 
of coverage but is usually unable to arrange for an immediate 
medical examination simultaneous with the receipt of the 
premium. The applicant is interested in immediate coverage 
and does not wish to pay the premium if coverage may be 
cancelled because of an unfavorable medical examination. 
(The dilemma and considerations of the company and applicant 
are discussed in Prince v. Western Empire Life Insurance Company, 
19 U. 2d 174 428 P. 2d 163 (1967)). 
The dilemma is usually resolved in favor of the insurance 
company inasmuch as it prepares all of the forms involved in 
the application and receipt of the premium. The usual arrange-
ment is that the company receives the premium and delivers a 
receipt noting the immediate effective coverage subject to a 
condition subsequent. The result is a one-sided obligation 
that permits the insurance company to escape its obligations 
on the basis of circumstances occurring between the time of 
the effective date, ~' (the date the premium is paid) and 
the later physical examination. 
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First Colony Life Insurance Company has not adopted a 
one-sided commitment. Under the terms of First Colony's 
Conditional Receipt, there is no possibility that the insurance 
company can avoid coverage by the benefit of hindsight. Unlike 
the usual situation where the effective date of the coverage 
begins with the receipt of the premium subject to the company's 
right to cancel, the First Colony receipt delays the effective 
date of the insurance until the medical examination is completed. 
In this manner there is no possibility that the company can 
earn a premium without undertaking the complete and inescapable 
obligation of the coverage. 
The case of Long v. United Benefit Life Insurance Inc., 
29 U.2d 204, 507 P.2d 375 (1973) involves an insurance policy 
which permits the company to avoid coverage by the benefit 
of hindsight. In that case the insurance company accepted the 
applicant's premium and delivered a receipt stating that 
coverage, if approved, would begin on the date of the applica-
tion. The applicant died subsequent to the application date, 
but before the date that the company approved the coverage. 
Upon learning of the applicant's death, the company disapproved 
the coverage for "confidential reasons." It was apparent from 
the facts of the case that had the applicant not died, the 
coverage would have been approved. 
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It was on this basis, ~. the illusory coverage be-
tween the application date and the approval date that the court 
imposed liability on the insurance company. 
The holding of the Lon~ case is inapplicable to the case 
at bar. The First Colony policy has no interium period whereby 
the company can disapprove coverage if the applicant dies 
before the approval date and collect a premium for such an 
illusory coverage if the applicant lives past the approval date. 
There are several other aspects of the Long case which 
make it inapplicable to the issues before the Court. In the 
Long case, the receipt given to the applicant did not require a 
medical examination. In the instant case, the receipt clearly 
made coverage conditional on a medical examination. In the 
Long case, the salesman was unquestionably an agent of the 
insurance company and gave the applicant an oral binder of 
coverage. In the instant case, there is no basis for an agency 
relationship between Mr. Meikle and the insurance company. 
On the contrary, the facts establish that Mr. Meikle was acting 
as the agent of Mr. and Mrs. Williams (see Point III, infra). 
The Receipt in the Long case did not specifically state that 
it was "conditional." Thus, when coupled with payment of 
the premium, an ambiguity was created as to whether coverage 
existed. However, the insurance company in the instant case, 
clearly designated the receipt as conditional. The insurance 
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company in the Long case was not prejudice by the decision 
imposing coverage inasmuch as there was nothing to indicate 
that it would have disapproved the risk. In the instant case, 
there was evidence prior to the medical examination which made 
coverage questionable and the absence of a medical examination 
clearly demonstrates that the insurance company was not yet 
advised of the risk. 
Since First Colony has no opportunity to retroactively 
avoid the obligations, there is no reason to impose upon the 
parties an agreement different than that stated on the 
Conditional Receipt. In this case, we are not confronted 
with the situation where the policy was cancelled by the 
insurance company after it had the benefit of hindsight. 
Rather, the situation is one where the insurance company 
and the insured clearly provided that the coverage never became 
effective. All parties to the contract agreed that the coverage 
would be effective on the "the date of completion of all 
medical examinations, tests, x-rays and electrograms ... " 
(This was the "latest" date of the four alternative dates 
mentioned in the Receipt). This agreement gave neither party 
any means to inequitably escape its obligations and thus the 
agreement should be upheld according to its terms. 
In those situations where the Conditional Receipt or 
other documents dealing with the effective date of the coverage 
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do not permit the insurance company to escape liability or 
collect premiums for an illusory coverage, the courts uphold 
the company's denial of coverage. In Linnastruth v. Mutual 
Benefit Health and Accident Association, 137 P.2d 833 
(Calif. 1943), the plaintiff's deceased husband made applica-
tion for insurance with the defendant insurance company. He 
delivered the initial premium to the company subject to the 
specific agreement that the insurance would not become effective 
until such time as the insurance company actually issued the 
policy. After payment of the premium and completion of the 
application, the applicant was involved in an accident which 
was within the scope of the coverage. The insu~ance company 
denied liability on the basis that the insurance had not yet 
taken effect. 
The appellant court upheld the decision of the trial 
court that despite payment of premium, and the apparent belief 
by the applicant that he was covered, there was no liability 
on the company since such liability would be contrary to the 
provisions of the insurance application which the applicant had 
signed. 
In Roscoe v. Banker's Life Insurance Company, 526 P.2d 
1080 (Ariz. 1974) the plaintiff's deceased husband made applica-
tion for life insurance to the defendant company and tendered 
The the first annual premium with the signed application. 
insurance company's agent issued a receipt for the annual 
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premium which specifically provided that a medical examination 
was a condition precedent to coverage. Prior to submitting 
to the physical examination, the applicant was killed in an 
airplane crash. The plaintiff in that case commenced an action 
alleging many of the points alleged by the plaintiff in the 
instant action, i.e., that the insurance coverage should be 
effective despite the conditions precedent stated in the 
Receipt. 
The appellant court upheld the summary judgment granted 
by the trial court, holding that coverage did not exist inasmuch 
as the conditions precedent to coverage had not been fulfilled. 
The basis of the court's decision was as follows: 
"We hold c.hc.t where a physical examina-
tion and phys:.':lans' medical questionnaire is 
required under the terms and provisions found 
here, the applicant must arrange for those to 
be furnished to the company before his appli-
cation is completed and before coverage can 
arise. • . The key factor in this case which 
distinguishes it from authorities cited by 
appellant is the failure of [the applicant] 
to obtain the required medical examination, 
for without it the essential element of insur-
ability, physical condition, was unknown to 
the company." 
In Prince v. Western Empire Life Insurance Company, 
19 U.2d 174, 428 P.2d 163 (1967), the court found no ambiguity 
or inequity in an applicant pre-paying the premium pursuant 
to a receipt which postpones coverage until completion of the 
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required medical examination. 
The Court noted that by postponing the effective date 
of coverage the insurance company had not created a situation 
where it could escape liability or collect a premium for an 
illusory coverage. By postponing the effective date, rather 
than having the coverage subject to a condition subsequent, 
the Court upheld the fairness of the transaction. In the course 
of the opinion the Court held: 
"We think that the binding receipt became 
effective on completion of the medical examination 
by the company doctor on September 22, 1960, unless 
at that time the applicant was not an insurable 
risk." 
In Aho v. United Transporation Union, 571 P.2d 1329 (Utah, 
1977), the applicant and the insurance company negotiated for 
the issuance of a life insurance policy and agreed that the 
same would become effective when the policy was actually 
issued to the applicant. Thus, like the instant case, there 
was no provision for immediate coverage subject to a condition 
subsequent, but rather the parties designated a future date 
when the policy would become effective. 
Although the applicant submitted to a medical examination, 
there was further medical information requested that was not 
supplied by the applicant. Prior to supplying the additional 
medical information, the insured died. 
The Court held that since the insured died prior to the 
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effective date of the policy, there was no coverage. 
The meaning of an insurance contract is determined by 
the same rules of construction as any other contract. Moore v. 
Prudential Insurance Company, 26 U.2d 430, 491 P.2d 227 (1971). 
The primary rule of construction is that the words used in a 
contract will be given their ordinary and usual meaning. 
Plain City Irrigation Company v. Hooper Irrigation Company, 
11 U.2d 188, 356 P.2d 625 (1960). The ordinary and usual 
meaning of the words in the Conditional Receipt establish that 
the coverage had not commenced at the time of the death of 
Dean Williams. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE 
C0~0ITIONAL RECEIPT AND APPLICATION 
In Section I of appellant's Brief, counsel contends 
that the Conditional Receipt which was delivered to Mrs. 
Williams in exchange for the premium check is ambiguous. 
However, after stating the conclusion of ambiguity, counsel 
fails to identify the claimed ambiguity and further fails to 
designate any language that could reasonably lead an applicant 
to believe that coverage would be effective prior to the 
physical examination. 
As a basis for the claimed ambiguity, appellant has 
paraphrased the language in the Conditional Receipt and 
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suggests that the paraphrased version is clearer than that 
in the Receipt. Even if counsel's language were clearer, 
such a comparison provides no support that the language in the 
Receipt is ambiguous. If there is any ambiguity, counsel should 
be able to state the ambiguity by quoting the language within 
the document itself and then noting the misinterpretation that 
can arise from the language. 
Counsel argues that reference to the "company rules" 
in some unexplained manner leads one to believe that coverage 
was immediately effective. Such an argument is merely an 
attempt to search for some basis to insert ambiguity into the 
clear statements of the Receipt. 
Despite reference to "company rules", the fact remains 
that the Conditional Receipt clearly notifies the applicant 
that coverage does not begin until a medical examination is 
conducted. Even if the Conditional Receipt were in some manner 
ambiguous, the requirements of coverage were clearly transmitted 
to Mrs. Williams in other documents. For example, the 
insurance company forwarded an "offer" which specifically noted 
the necessity of a physical examination. The offer specifi-
cally and unequivocally noted the conditions to the offer: 
Requirements; application, medical 
examination with three blood pressure 
readings, home office specimen, x-ray. 
(Bischoff, Exhibit D-1). 
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Kenneth Bischoff testified that upon receipt of this 
offer he contacted Meikle and "reviewed it and outlined what 
he [Meikle] wotld have to get from Mrs. Willi~~s" (Bischoff, 
p. 16). Meikle acknowledged that Bischoff showed him a copy 
of the offer wbich specifically stated the requirements 
to coverage (Meikle, p. 27). Mr. Meikle then went to the 
Williams residence and showed them the offer (Meikle, p. 27-
28). Meikle tJ~en discussed arrangements for the medical 
examination (M.~ikle, p. 28; Williams, p. 43). Mrs. Williams 
obviously gras?ed the meaning of the document inasmuch that 
she admitted that she knew a physical examination was a 
"requirement" :Jf the coverage (Williams p. 43). 
The requirement of a medical examination was not a 
surprise for ~ rs. Williams. She knew that her husband's 
condition incieased the risk because of the rated premium 
imposed by Occ:idental in connection with the prior policy 
(Meikle, p. 1.). Mrs. Williams remembered that a physical 
examination W:ts a "requirement" of the prior Occidental 
policy (Willi~ms, p. 45). 
Aside fr~m Mrs. Williams' unequivocal admission that 
she knew that a medical examination was a requirement, and 
her prior e~erience with medical examination requirements, 
her actions cfter the death of her husband compel the 
conclusion ttat she knew there was no coverage without the 
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examination. Subsequent to the death of the insured, 
Mrs. Williams concealed her husband's death from the company 
in the hope that a policy would be erroneously issued 
(Bischoff, p. 36; Meikle, p. 66). If Nrs. Williams really 
believed that the policy was in force, she would have 
immediately submitted a claim. 
Aside from the condition clearly noted in the Conditional 
Receipt, the application which Hrs. Williams signed (Bischoff, 
Exhibit 3) gave additional notice to Mrs. Williams that 
coverage was not immediate. On page two of the application, 
just above the place where Mr. and Mrs. Williams affixed their 
signatures there was a paragraph heading bearing the title 
"Applicants Declaration." It is therein noted that unless 
otherwise stated in the Conditional Receipt, the coverage 
will not be effective unless "the policy is delivered to the 
owner during the life time ... " (Bischoff, Exhibit P-3). 
Thus, the fact that coverage was not then effective 
was transmitted to Mrs. Williams in four different forms: 
(a) the wording of the Conditional Receipt (Bischoff, Exhibit 
P-2); (b) the wording of the "Applicants Declaration" in the 
insurance application (Bischoff, Exhibit P-3); (c) the offer 
of insurance dated February 18, 1976 (Bischoff, Exhibit D-1); 
and, (d) the oral statements made by Allen Meikle to Mr. and 
Mrs. Williams (Neikle, pp. 30-31; Williams, 43). Of greatest 
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importance, is the fact that one or more of these sources 
were effective since Mrs. Williams realized that a physical 
examination was one of the requirements of the coverage 
(Williams, p. 43). 
Only one of these sources is claimed to be ambiguous, 
and appellant has been unable to state the nature of the 
ambiguity or the false impression that arises from a reading 
of the language. 
POINT III 
ALLEN MEIKLE WAS THE AGENT OF MAVIS WILLIAMS 
Many of appellant's arguments are based upon the pro-
positiou ~hat Allen Meikle was the agent of First Colony Life 
Insurance Company. This alleged agency relationship is merely 
assumed by appellant. No where does appellant offer any facts 
or authorities in support of this assumption. 
Before dealing with the particular points raised by 
appellant which are based upon this assumption, respondent 
will deal with the agency question separately rather than 
repeating the argument each time that agency is assumed by 
appellant. 
A brief review of the circumstances of the case demonstrates 
that at all times during the course of the transaction in 
question, Allen Meikle was the agent of Mavis Williams and not 
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the agent of First Colony. 
As previously noted, Mrs. Williams and Mr. Heikle were 
co-employees at Hill Air Force Base and the two had been 
friends for approximately eight years before the transactions 
herein described (Williams, p. 6). Mrs. Williams was aware 
that Mr. Meikle was an insurance agent and requested that he 
attempt to locate coverage for her husband (Williams, pp. 13-
14). 
At the time of Mrs. Williams' request, Allen Meikle was 
an agent for Occidental Insurance Company (Meikle, p. 6). 
He had never represented First Colony Life Insurance (Meikle, 
p. 50). 
Meikle obtained coverage with his principal company, 
Occidental Life Insurance Company which was later cancelled 
at the request of Mrs. Williams (Williams pp. 19-21). 
Subsequent to the cancellation, Meikle began looking 
for replacement coverage. He realized that coverage may 
be difficult and sought the assistance of Kenneth Bischoff 
who had previously assisted him in locating high risk 
coverages (Meikle, pp. 15-16). Mr. Bischoff, and his partner, 
Lowell Smith, were agents of Northwestern Mutual Life 
Insurance and neither had theretofore been involved with 
First Colony Life Insurance Company (Bischoff, pp.6-7, 52). 
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Kenneth Bischoff contacted United Underwriters, the 
local agent of First Colony Life. United Underwriters sent 
out inquiries to various companies. On February 18, 1976, 
United Underwriters received the offer of insurance from First 
Colony Life (Bischoff, Exhibit D-1). 
Accompanying the application was a "Single Case Agreement" 
(Meikle, Exhibit D-3). This is a contract used when insurance 
is sold through a person who is not a party to a regular 
agency agreement and is designed to define the rights iwth 
respect to a single insurance transaction. 
The Single Case Agreement was signed by Lowell Smith 
(Kenneth Bischoff's partner) on April 22, 1976 (Meikle, Exhibit 
D-3). This was nine days after the application was signed 
by Mrs. Williams and three days after the death of Dean 
Williams. Allen Meikle never did sign the Single Case Agreement 
or any other agency agreement with First Colony or any of its 
agents (Meikle, p. 49; Meikle, Exhibit D-3). The only document 
upon which Mr. Meikle's name appears is the last page of the 
application where the percentage division of commissions is 
noted (Bischoff, Exhibit 3). Inasmuch as the application was 
not signed by anyone until April 22, 1976, it is apparent that 
on that date First Colony did not know Allen Heikle nor did it 
know that he was involved in the transaction. 
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It is apparent that in this transaction, Mr. Meikle 
was acting as an "insurance broker. " In Couch, Insurance 2d 
§§25:92, 25:94, the author states: 
"An 'insurance broker' is one who acts 
as a middleman between the insured and the 
insurer, and who solicits insurance from 
the public under no employment from any special 
company, and who, upon securing an order 
places it with a company selected by the 
insured, or, in the absence of such a selection 
with the company selected by himself; whereas ~ 
'insurance agent' is one who represents an 
insurer under an employment by it. Whether a 
person acts as a broker or an agent is not 
determined by what he is called but is to be 
determined from what he does. In other words, 
his acts determine whether he is an agent or 
a broker. . . The fact that one is an i~sur­
ance agent for some compankes, and, as such, 
authorized to issue policies, etc., does not 
prevent hkm from actkng merely as a broker 
in procuring other insurance. Thks result is 
not effected by the fact that the agent retained 
a commission for placing the insurance." 
(Emphasis added) 
Mr. 11eikle' s status as a "broker" is further confirmed 
by the description in Utah Code Annotated §31-17-2 (1953), as 
amended: 
"'Broker' means any person who, on behalf 
of the insured, for compensation as an indepe~dent 
contractor or commission, or fee, and not bekng 
an agent of the insurer, solicits, negotiates, 
or procures knsurance or reinsuranc~ or the 
renewal or continuance thereof, or kn any ~anner 
aids therein for insureds or for prospect7ve 
insureds oth~r than himself ... " (Emphasks added). 
Compare the above definition with that of "agent", Utah Code 
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Annotated §13-17-1 (1953). 
Inasmuch as Meikle was acting as a broker rather than 
as an agent for his company, the following authorities establish 
that he became the agent of Mr. and Mrs. Williams and did not 
act as an agent of First Colony Life Insurance Company. The 
status of brokers is clearly defined in the leading treatise 
on the subject, Couch, Insurance 2d, §25.94: 
"An insurance broker, like other brokers, 
is primarily the agent of the first person who 
employs him, and ~s therefore ordinarily the 
agent of the insured as to matters connected 
w~th the procurement of insurance, including 
representat~ons and warranties. Absent some 
special condition or circumstances in the 
particular case, a brokeris not the agent of 
the insurer and may not be converted into an 
agent for the insurer without some action on 
the part of the insurer, or existence of some 
facts by which his authority to represent it 
may be fairly inferred. The circumstances 
that, at the time the broker solicited business, 
he did not know which insurance company would 
issue the policy, and that the company which 
subsequently did issue the policy had no prior 
dealings with the broker, indeed, had not heard 
of him, militate strongly against a conclusion 
that the broker was acting as the agent for 
such company. 
If insurance is written in companies which 
the agent does not represent, he is generally 
regarded as acting as a broker and as the agent 
of the insured in procuring insurance, whereas 
if it is written in companies which he represents, 
he is usually held to be the agent of the company 
and not of the insured." 
The proposition that a broker acts as an agent of the 
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insured, is further noted in 43 American J · 2d 
• ur~sprudence 
§149: 
"An insurance broker is primarily the 
age~t o~ the first person who employs him, and 
ord~nar~ly, where employed to procure insurance, 
he becomes the agent of the person for whom the 
insurance is procured, at least insofar as all 
matters connected with the procurement itself 
are concerned, with the consequence that his 
acts and representations within the scope of 
his authority are binding upon the insured. 
It has been said that an insurance broker is 
ordinarily employed by the person seeking ins-
urance and when so employed, is to be distinguished 
from the ordinary agent who is employed by 
insurance companies to solicit and write ins-
urance by and in the company. Upon similar 
principles, an ordinary broker who ~s not the 
agent of any insurance company, but procures 
insurance of a company through its regular 
agents, is the agent of the insured ... " 
(Emphasis added). 
This Court has also adhered to the rule that negotiations 
between an insurance salesman and a person seeking insurance 
coverage creates an agency relationship between the two if 
the salesman is not bound to place the insurance in a company 
which he normally represents. Barnett v. State Automobile and 
Casualty Underwriters, 26 U.2d 169, 487 P.2d 311 (1971). 
Accord, H & H Manufacturing Company v. Cimarron Insurance 
Company, 302 s.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1957); France v. Citizens Casualty 
Company, 79 N.E.2d 28 (Ill. 1948). 
In Section IV of her Brief, the appellant cites several 
cases which she claims supports the contention that Allen 
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Meikle was acting as the agent of First Colony Life Insurance 
Company. However, none of the cited cases support the 
proposition. 
The case of Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Company v. 
Carolina Gas Insurance Company, 402 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1968), 
has no bearing on the issues involved here inasmuch as the 
agents in that case had written insurance for the company on 
a recurring basis. The agency question was therefore resolved 
in summary fashion. There were no facts which gave rise to 
a serious dispute as to agency and the affiliation between the 
insurance companies and the agents was much greater than in 
the instant case. 
In Prassel Enterprises, Inc. v. All State Insurance 
Company, 405 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1968), the question of agency 
was discussed, but the factors considered in the agency 
question do not exist in the instant case. The case involved 
the responsibility of a soliciting agent for failing to notify 
the insurance company of a pending suit after having received 
notice of the suit from the insured. The affiliation between 
the agent and the issuing company was much greater than in 
the instant case. 
The case of Houston Fire & Casualty Company v. Jones, 
315 F.2d 116 (lOth Cir. 1963), involved a situation where the 
alleged agent had been instructed in solicitation techniques 
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and the use of binders by the issuing company. By reason 
of these instructions and prior association between the 
agent and the company, the Court held that the agent had 
implied authority to bind the company. Inasmuch as Mr. Meikle 
had no prior association whatsoever with the respondent in 
this case prior to the application, the case has no bearing 
on the issues before this Court. 
In Pfiester v. Missouri State Life Insurance Company, 
116 P,2d 245 (Kan. 1911), the issue was the extent of 
limitation on an agent's authority rather than the existence 
of agency. The agent had a continuing affiliation with the 
issuing company, a fact that is absent in the instant case. 
The case of Denny v. Washington National Insurance 
Company, 165 N.W.2d 600 (Mich. 1966), also involved a situation 
wherein agent had a continuing affiliation with the company, 
a situation not present in the instant case. 
Appellant cites warner v. Continental Gas Company, 
534 P.2d 695 (Okla. 1975) and Atlas Life Insurance Company 
v. Eastman, 320 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1957) in support of the 
proposition that a soliciting agent binds his principal with 
respect to all acts within the apparent scope of his authority. 
However, in both cases, the existence of agency was uncontested 
· t' ous affiliation 
and there was ample evidence establish~ng a con ~nu 
between the agents and the insurance companies. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-30-
The case of Ferrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance 
Company, 120 Utah 109, 232 P.2d 754 (1950), involved a 
situation where a plaintiff applied for and was issued a fire 
insurance policy with the defendant companies. Plaintiff 
purchased this policy through Bowman. Certain facts 
relevant to the risk of insuring the building were trans-
mitted to Bowman, but Bowman did not transmit this information 
to the insurance companies involved. Bowman received the 
application and transmitted the same to the general agent. 
When the policy was issued, Bowman affixed his name to the 
policy as the agent and thereafter serviced the policy by 
receiving the monthly premiums and transmitting the funds to 
the general agent. 
The Court held that Bowman had implied authoirty of an 
agent since he acted as though he were the general agent. 
On this basis, this Court imputed the knowledge of Bowman to 
the insurance companies. 
The facts of the Ferrington case distinguish it from the 
case now before the Court: 
First, the Ferrington case involved mere imputing knowledge 
of an agent to a principle whereas the instant case involves 
an agent binding an insurance company to terms inconsistent 
with the policy provisions. The insurance companies in the 
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Ferrington case clothed Bowman with such authority by per-
mitting him to function in the manner outlined in the Court's 
opinion. Hmvever, in the instant case, the insurance company 
did nothing to permit the proposed insured to reasonably assume 
that Meikle had authority to bind the company to the policy. 
On the contrary, the company took reasonable measures to 
assure the proposed insured that Meikle has no such authority. 
The Conditional Receipt (Bischoff, Exhibit 2) which was 
delivered to ~rrs. Williams at the time of the alleged oral 
binder (Williams, p. 50; Meikle, p. 33) specifically stated 
in the second paragraph: 
"Neither the agent nor the medlcal 
examiner is authorized to alter or waive 
these conditions." 
Thus, if Mrs. Williams erroneously regarded Heikle as an 
agent of the company, she was notified that he had no authority 
to bind the company to coverage. For this reason, the opinion 
in the Ferrington case has no bearing on the issues now before 
the court. 
Second, the insured in the Ferrington case had every reason 
to believe that Bowman was a duly authorized agent for the 
company. 
'11' knew that Meikle In the instant case, Mrs. Wl lams 
was an insurance broker (Williams, P· 13) and that the con-
be Obtained after Meikle "checked templated coverage would 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-32-
around" with several companies (Williams, pp. 14, 16, 33). 
Third, the insurance company in the Ferrington case 
knew that Bowman was involved in the transaction and accepted 
the benefits of his efforts. One of the grounds for implying 
agency, was that the company accepted the benefits and were 
attempting to deny the corresponding liabilities. In the 
instant case, First Colony Life Insurance Company had no know-
ledge that Meikle was even involved in the transaction and 
thus did not acquiesce in his involvement. Moreover, inas-
much as a policy was never issued, the company received 
no benefits from the acts of Mr. Meikle. 
There are simply no acts or circumstances in the instant 
case which could possibly be construed as giving Meikle 
authority to bind First Colony Life Insurance Company to 
coverage inconsistent with the terms of the proposed coverage. 
On the contrary, the documents delivered to Mrs. Williams 
specifically notified her that Mr. Meikle was not authorized 
to make such a representation. 
Appellant cites Long v. United Benefit Life Insurance 
Company, 29 U.2d 204, 507 P.2d 375 (1973) as support for the 
proposition that Meikle was the agent of First Colony so that 
the company was committed to Meikle's oral binder of coverage. 
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However, a brief reading of the Long case establishes that 
the agents involved were clearly general agents of the 
issuing company and the agency question was, therefore, not 
contested. 
There is no basis whatsoever in the instant case upon 
which the trier of fact could determine that Mr. Meikle was 
acting as the agent of First Colony Life Insurance Company. 
On the date that the application was signed, he had not pre-
viously sold insurance for First Colony Life, he had never 
communicated with First Colony Life, he had not written or 
oral agency agreement with First Colony Life, he has not 
to this date signed any contract with First Colony Life with 
respect to this transaction and his involvement in the 
transaction were totally unknown to First Colony Life. 
Inasmuch as there is no basis to find Mr. Meikle the 
agent of First Colony Life, the company cannot be held liable 
on the basis of his statements of coverage or other activity 
on his part. 
POINT IV 
ALL PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION WERE AWARE THAT 
A MEDICAL EXAMINATION WAS A REQUIREMENT OF COVERAGE. 
In Point II of appellant's Brief, it is argued that the 
Court should consider facts outside the Conditional Receipt 
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in order to determine the intent of the parties at the time 
the Receipt was issued. However, it should be noted, that 
consideration of evidence other than the Receipt itself should 
be made only if the wording of the Receipt is ambiguous. 
Milford State Bank v. West Field Canal & Irrigation Company, 
108 Utah 528, 162 P.2d 101 (1945); Oregon Short LineR. Co. v. 
Idaho Stockyards Co., 12 U.2d 205, 364 P.2d 826 (1961). As 
previously noted (see Point II, supra), appellant has failed 
to note any wording in the Conditional Receipt which would lead 
a prospective insured to believe that coverage would begin at 
any time prior to the physical examination. For this reason, 
the Court should not look beyond the wording of the Receipt to 
determine the intent of the parties. In the event the Court 
does look to evidence outside the Conditional Receipt, the 
facts establish that all parties intended coverage to begin 
at the time of the physical examination. 
Everyone associated with the contract knew that a 
physical examination was a requirement of the coverage. Allen 
Meikle testified: 
"Q. Did you ever in that conversation 
use the words 'firm offer'? 
A. Not to my recollection, no, Sir. 
Q. Did you regard that as a firm offer? 
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A. I knew it wasn't a firm offer." 
(Meikle, pp. 26-27). 
Mr. Bischoff testified: 
". . . then I found out that Mr 
Williams had not completed the req~irements 
and at that point, then, my counsel would 
have been the policy is not in force and 
I don't think the claim will be paid." 
(Bischoff, p. 36). 
As previously noted, Mavis Williams also testified that 
she knew that a physical examination was a requirement of the 
policy (Williams, p. 43). 
The best evidence of the intent of the parties is the 
wording of the documents involved. Continental Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Bybee, 6 U.2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 \l955); Ephraim Theatre 
Co. v. Hawk, 7 U.2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958). In this regard, 
the wording of the Conditional Receipt is incapable of any 
reasonable interpretation other than coverage must await a 
physical examination. The language of the Receipt is quoted 
on pages 6-7, supra. 
The offer of insurance dated February 18, 1976, clearly 
set forth the fact that there were certain requirements of 
coverage. Appellant has not contended that these words 
are in any manner ambiguous. A review of the "requirements" 
in the offer establishes the absence of any ambiguity. 
The offer of insurance was given by First Colony to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-36-
Bischoff (Bischoff, p. 14) who carefully reviewed the require-
ments with Mr. Meikle (Bischoff, p. 16). Mr. Meikle then 
exhibited the document to Mr. and Mrs. Williams during their 
meeting on April 13, 1976 (Meikle, pp. 27-28). 
The lengthly explanation which Bischoff gave to Mr. 
Meikle is significant inasmuch as the l<nowledge of Mr. Meikle 
is attributed to Mrs. Williams (see agency argument, Point III). 
In addition to the acknowledgement by Mrs. Williams 
as to the requirements of coverage, her past experience 
with respect to life insurance coverage for her husband supports 
her full understanding as to the conditions of coverage. Mrs. 
Williams had been involved in a prior insurance application wiw 
Mr. Meikle and understood that a physical examination was a 
condition to that coverage (Williams, pp. 45-46). There are 
no statements or activities attributable to First Colony Life 
which would lead to a different understanding with respect 
to the policy in question. 
By reason of the medical examination associated with the 
first insurance policy, Mrs. Williarms was aware that there 
were health problems that were significant for insurance 
purposes (Williams, pp. 25-32, 35). This problem had caused 
a long delay in locating coverage (Williams, pp. 25-32,35). 
Certainly under these circumstances, no one could reasonably 
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conclude that a physical examination was a meaningless 
requirement. 
The fact that an appointment was made for a medical 
examination to be held on April 20, 1976, is inconsistent with 
Mrs. Williams' claimed understanding that such an examination 
was unnecessary. 
Finally, if Mrs. Williams believed that an insurance 
policy was in full force and effect on the date Mr. Williams 
died, it is logical that she would have made a claim under 
the policy immediately after his death. Instead, she concealed 
his death from First Colony Life in the hope that a policy 
would be erroneously issued {Bischoff, p. 36; Meikle, p. 66). 
POINT V 
CONDITIONS OF COVERAGE WERE COMMUNICATED TO APPELLANT 
In Section III of her Brief, appellant argues that 
First Colony had a duty to communicate the limitations of 
coverage to her and that the company failed to discharge 
this duty. 
Appellant cites Prince v. Western Empire Life Insurance 
Company, 19 U.2d 174, 428 P.2d 163 (1967) and Ransom v. Penn 
Mutual Life Insurance Company, 274 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1954), as 
standing for the proposition that an insurance company has 
a duty to explain limitations of the coverage. However, 
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neither of the cited cases supported that proposition. 
In the Prince case, the Receipt delivered to the applicant 
provided that coverage would commence on the date of the 
medical examination. Unlike the instant case, the applicant 
submitted to the physical examination and the physician approved 
his application. However, due to some medical history, the 
company requested further physical examinations. While the 
further medical examinations were being processed, the 
applicant died. The Court held that the policy became 
effective upon completion of the first medical examination 
as stated in the Conditional Receipt. 
Inasmuch as the applicant in the instant case did not 
complete his medical examination, the Prince case has no 
bearing on the issues before the Court. Moreover, no where 
in the Prince opinion did the Court impose any duty upon an 
insurance company to explain the limitations of coverage in 
any more detail than stated in the Conditional Receipt. 
In the Ransom case, the applicant also had submitted to 
a medical examination and the physician found nothing wrong 
with his physical condition. The wording of the Receipt 
in the Ransom case was much more involved than the Receipt 
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involved in the instant case. Moreover, there was language 
in the Ransom Receipt from which one could conclude that cover-
age was applicable at the time of the payment of the premium. 
Based upon that language, the Court held that the coverage 
was in force at the time of the medical examination. Inasmuch 
as the insured in the Ransom case submitted to a physical 
examination and the Ransom Receipt involved dissimilar wording, 
the case has no bearing on the issues involved in this case. 
None of the cases cited by appellant suggest an obligation 
on the part of the company to explain limitations of its 
coverage. Even if such an obligation were imposed, it was 
satisfied in the instant case. The requirements for coverage 
were clearly stated in the offer of insurance (Bischoff, Exhibit 
1) , these conditions were explained by Bischoff to ~1eikle 
(Bischoff, p. 16), Meikle clearly understood the conditions 
(Meikle, pp. 26-27) and Heikle showed the offer to Mrs. 
IVilliams (rieikle, pp. 28-29). 
POINT VI 
APPELLffi~T HAS ABANDONED THE CLAIM THAT THE REPRE-
SENTATIONS OF HR. MEIKLE ARE BINDING ON FIRST COLONY 
Under Point IV of her brief, appellant argues that 
the oral representations made by Hr. Heikle on April 13, 1976, 
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were binding on First Colony. It should be noted, that this 
is the first time that appellant has asserted this argument. 
During the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, counsel 
for appellant clearly and unequivocally stated that he did 
not regard the oral representations by Mr. Meikle as being 
binding on the insurance company. During the course of the 
hearing counsel stated: 
" ••. looking at what would be the 
ordinary person's interpretation of the 
contract, Mrs. Williams has Mr. Heikle, 
an agent, a licensed insurance agent, 
telling her after her husband died, before 
any medical examination, that there wouldn't 
be any problem. Now, I guess, in con-
clusion what I can state is, No. 1, if 
the Court views the wording in that Con-
ditional Receipt to be unambiguous, 
then certainly we should avoid going 
fon~ard with the trial of this matter, 
because if it is unambiguous then I 
don't think the plaintiff really has a 
claim against the insurance company." 
Record 181. 
"MR. McDONALD: I would like to point 
out one item in response, your Honor, 
actually two. I think as counsel has 
indicated, if the Court finds that the 
wording of the Conditional Receipt is 
clear and unambiguous, as I understand 
l1r. Ashton, that is the only basis of 
your claim against the insurance company; 
is that correct? 
MR. ASHTON: Well, the other claim 
as I have tried to describe is that the 
insurance company is under an affirmative 
obligation to instruct its agent, either 
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personally or by written form of 
the nature of coverage, and that wasn't 
done in this case. 
MR. McDONALD: Hell, I suppose that 
~ou would acknowledge that if the Receipt 
~s clear then there is no need for an 
explanation? 
MR. ASHTON: Well, that's probably 
true." (Record 184-185) 
The law is clear that an issue not submitted to the 
trial court cannot be submitted for the first time on appeal. 
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water and Irrigation Co., 118 
Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577 (1950); Drummond v. Union Pacific R. 
Co., 111 Utah 289, 177 P.2d 903 (1947); State v. Larkin, 27 
U.2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Tygesen v. Magna lvater Co., 
13 U.2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962). 
To the extent the Court considers this contention of 
appellant, it is apparent that the statements by Mr. Meikle 
are not binding on First Colony inasmuch as Mr. Meikle was 
acting as the agent of Mrs. Williams. See authorities cited 
under Point III, supra. 
Even if Mr. Meikle had been acting as the agent for 
First Colony, his representations would still not be binding 
on the company. At the time of the alleged representations 
by t1r. Meikle, Mr. and Mrs. vlilliarns had in their possession 
the original of the Conditional Receipt. That Receipt clearly 
and unequivocally stated: 
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"Neither the agent nor the medical 
examiner is authorized to alter or waive 
these conditions." 
The "conditions" which the agent could not waive was the 
condition requiring medical examinations. 
Utah Code Annotated §31-19-18 (1953), as amended, 
provides: 
"No insurer or its agent, nor any 
solicitor or broker shall make any 
contract of insurance or agreement as 
to such contract, other than is plainly 
expressed in the policy issued thereon. 
Any such understanding or agreement not 
so expressed shall be invalid." 
The alleged statement by Mr. Meikle as to the existence of 
coverage was diametrically opposed to the clearly stated 
conditions precedent to the coverage, and such statement was 
therefore invalid. 
As noted under Point III, supra, Allen Meikle was the 
agent of Mavis Williams and not First Colony Life. Thus, any 
false impression created by his alleged oral binder cannot 
be asserted against First Colony Life. 
POINT VII 
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS HAVE BEEN SATISFIED 
Appellant argues under Point V, that public policy requires 
that an insurance company be bound by the oral representations 
of its agents. 
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This is another point raised by appellant for the 
first time on appeal. Public policy considerations were not 
pleaded nor argued during the course of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. For that reason, such arguments should not be 
considered in this Court (see authorities cited under Point 
VI, supra) . 
First Colony has no reason to contest appellant's public 
policy argument. No one in this action has alleged that 
First Colony's agent made any m~sleading statements to Mrs. 
Williams. 
Respondent's local agent, United Underwriters, made no 
false or misleading statements tc Hrs. lhlliams. Its only 
communication occurred by its transmission of the application 
and offer of insurance to Mr. Bischoff. 
Appellant has not alleged that Mr. Bischoff or Mr. Lowell 
Smith were agents of First Colony Life. Even if they were 
considered agents, they made no false or misleading statements 
to Mrs. Williams. Their only communication occurred when Mr. 
Bischoff transmitted the offer of insurance and application to 
Hr. Meikle and called his attention to the requirements of the 
coverage. 
The only other individual involved is Mr. Meikle, who is 
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obviously the agent of Mrs. Williams and not the agent of 
First Colony Life (see Point III, supra). 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the several legal issues involved in this 
case, the factual situation is rather simple. Mr. and Mrs. 
Williams made an application for life insurance to First 
Colony Insurance Company. At the time of the application, 
both were aware that he suffered from some physical ailments 
which were significant for insurance purposes. At the time 
of their application, they had been denied coverage for these 
health reasons and had received a rated premium policy which 
they found unsatisfactory. 
In these circumstances Mrs. Williams received an offer 
of insurance from First Colony which required a medical examina-
tion. Such a requirement should not come as a surprise to any 
reasonable person, especially when experienced in the previous 
attempts to locate coverage. 
A belief that First Colony Life, or any other company, 
would accept the risk of an insured with a known medical 
problem without first determining the extent of the risk is 
simply unreasonable regardless of the wording of any particular 
document. 
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Aside from the circumstances of the case, it is undisputed 
that Mrs. Williams received the Conditional Receipt, the offer 
of insurance and the application, all of which specifically 
noted that there were conditions and requirements to coverage. 
Under such circumstances, the summary judgment granted 
by the lower court should be sustained. 
Respectfully Submitted ~s . day of October, 1978. 
( JON S, WALDO, & McDONOUGH 
I , ,I 
:I . 
~· 
R 
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